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by 
Joshua D. Angrist 
Apr· i 1 i '7'82 Dber' 1 in Co 1 1 ege 
A. Intr'oduction (1) 
The most disturbing and difficuit empirical problems of 
labor economics revolve around the absence of crucial 
information; the wage an unemployed person would receive if he or 
she were worKing. The most controversial pol icy problem of labor 
economIcs is embodied in the question; when is unemployment a 
problem? The goal of this paper is to propose a methodology for 
studying the first problem that sheds some light on the second. 
1"10':. t ee cln am i·:. t ';:. a.gr ee t h a. t ':some 1 eve 1 of un emp 1 oymen t i 'E. B. 
necessary and socially efficent characteristic of the 1.:r.bor· 
m.;:'.r·l< e t . This necessary level of unemployment is often thought to 
be a.r· ou n d to 2% and an important part of 
efficient al location of human resources. [.<·1h <:t. t a.bou t 
unemployment? A case can be made that at 5% unemployment a 
por·tion of the unempl incentives to worK 
eroded by transfer payments and the progressive tax structure. 
Some might say that such a level of unemployment i';:. to be 
e::< pee ted i,.· • .!h en the government interferes in the labor market 
raising the opportunity cost of working. And 10X unemplyment? 
Surely some of these people are "involuntarily" unemployed. They 
·:;'.r·e not unempl because they are looKing for better jobs 
on unemployment compensation or some other sort of 
t r· .;:., n;;;. fer' income that it is not worth their while to taKe a JOD. 
they have looKed for worK, are wi! 1 ing to worK at 
(1) This paper would have been impossible without the assistance 
and patience of the Oberl in College Economics Department and the 
staff of the Oberl in Col lege Computing Center. 
prevail ing wages and are capable of productive activity. How does 
one find out who these people are or prove to the sceptic th.:..t 
they exist at all? Sociologists might asK them but in economics 
we are all behaviorists. 
Something we do have an idea about i·::. the ty'pe of 
information relevant ot the individual's decision to work or not 
to 1;.,1or·k. In fact, we can precisely formulate some theoretical 
decision rules and then asK how well our t h eor' e tic a.l dec i ';;i on 
rules explain the behavior that we actually observe in the labor 
market. Any economic characterization of an individual's decision 
maKing process taKes into account the costs and benefits of an 
action taKen, where these costs and benefits are evalDated at the 
The relevant marginal benefit in the case of 
decision is clearly the hourly wage. Of course, this ~ay not be a 
single Known number. WorKers may have expectations about the 
disrtibution of wage rates over time as in the literature on Job 
in t er' t empc,r' .:'.1 ·:;.ubs.t i tu t i on, AnQther' in t er' e':;. tin g 
rnodi fica. t i on to the simple notion of a single hourly wage is the 
imp1 icit contracts model wherein worKers U s @1)" Job security in 
return fQr a hi er hourly wage. Lucas and the 
readers may find a recent examination of it in Ashenf@lter and 
A1ton,ji provides an example of ·;:'.n 
impl icit contracts model. Al thou these approach@s are not 
incorporat@d here 1S not because they are thc~ught 
withQut merit. In fact they are very appeal ing in that they treat 
information as any other good; one which eCQnQmic agents behave 
purposefully and rationally in collection and usage (McCullum, 
1 '7'::::(1 p , 7 17) , In ,::.ur' model of the labor marKet and wage 
determi n·;:.. t i on i t is the asKIng wage which represents 
counterpart of the offered wage; the offered wage IS the marginal 
benefi.t from worKing another hour while the asKing wage i~ the 
marginal cost, the opportunity cost of worKing as measured by the 
',,/a.lue of leisur'e time, income, o t her' I.J,)()r'1< 
opportunities and consumption pressure. The opportunity cost of 
!.i.Jc;.r·t< i n 9 i -;:. ·::'.n .:;..1 B.I;;tou ':;:. to Gr' on .:=t.U .... ;:. ( 1973 ::. "\.JB.l u e clf t ime" i:I.nd 
be used to develop an econometric specification for what 
will be cal led the participation wage in the rest of the analysis 
F'r·es.en ted her'e, 
In this paper we would liKe to asK what sorts of decision 
rules will best explain the observed distribution of wage rates 
p.::..i d. If we understand something about the way the observed wage 
d i ':E. t r' i bu 1: i on is drawn from the population of wage rates; 
the wages paid to those who worK and the wages the unemployed 
could expect if they were worKing, then we may be in a position 
particular we asK: i ':;:. un emp 1 e')-''rnen t the ,'e-;:.ult of utilit:/ 
maximizing decision maKers who, in equil ibrium, have chosen not 
to worK because the costs (the participation wage) exceed the 
be Ii e fit ';:. ( the Ii·'! a. get he>.·' c 0 u 1 d e)( pee t f r' om 1; • .1 0 P f< i n 9 :;. .::' I J': i Ii f." •. c t 
this is the true nature of unemployment then clearly the observed 
wage distribution cannot be an unbiased sample of the true wage 
distribution because the people for whom we observe a wage are 
" s.pee i .8.1 " in the sense that they have an equilibrium position in 
P"'.ge 4 
the labor market which is a consequence of their particular 
expected return to work and opportunity cost of working. The bias 
in the observed wage distribution is a by-product of the nature 
of the equilibrium which generated that distribution. Of course 
it i~ also possible that the unemployed (and correspondingly the 
employed) may not be in utility maximizing equilibrium, yet they 
may still be special in some sense, that is, the observed wage 
distribution may still suffer from sample selection. In the 
econometric work to follow in this paper it will be assumed that 
if the unemployed are not "voluntarily" out of work in the sense 
that they are in the equilibrium discussed above then they are a 
random subs . .;;..mpl e elf the popul ation in the l"'.bor· fc.rce. N..,.tur..,.11::.' 
this is a highly unrealistic assumption and even within narrowly 
def i ned demc.gr· a.ph i c gr ou p';:' the obs·erved 1.I·.Ia,ge da. t a. 1.1 • .1 ill s· till h ..",,-Ie 
some sample selection bias, i.e., not reflect the tru~ wage 
distribution for that demographic group, even if all the 
unemployed within that group are not in equilibrium. However, if 
the unemployed are not in equilibrium in the sense that 
would be better off by working ( where better off means that the 
wage they could expect to receive exceeds the wage at which they 
would be willing to offer positive hours) then the sample 
selection rule which determines the observed wage distribution 
cannot be the one that says: " the people whose wage we don/t 
observe are those whose participation wage is in excess of their 
expec ted I;.Jage II Therefore, to for the pr'esence of 
invol'Jntary' IJnemplc.~,..ment tNe I.Alil] cc.mpare the predictive a.bility 
of the mc.de 1 of equilibrium voluntary unemployment with the 
simplest alternative; unemployment occurs with a constant 
uncondi t i clna 1 probability p, the best estimator of which is the 
r' e 1 at i'v'e f r' equ en c ::,..' of un emp 1 I::.ymen t. Th i s sor t of c ompar i son i,;:, 
conceptually similar to the standard F-test in multivariate 
regression analysis where a detailed specification is compared 
with the naive estimator, the mean of the dependent variable, to 
determine the legitimacy of the detailed specification. 
Unfortunately the statistics of the process are not at all 
comparable to the F-test procedure as will be shown in later 
sections of the paper. The natural choice for the model wherein 
the unemployed are in utility maximizing equilibri.um is Nelson's 
( 1 '7'74) Censored Regression Model, designed specifically to 
overcome the problem of sample selection bias that arises when 
observed data is not an unbiased sample of the population for the 
reasons discussed here (2). 
The Cens·clr·ed Regressi on Model pr'oposed by Nel-:.cln i -:. s.hown bel ow ~ 
v.~e (i) = 8 lX 1 + u ( i) 
Wp(i) = 82X2 + vei) 
W: i) = Wee i) 
Wei) = 0 otherwise. 
iNhere 
(2)This model can be 'seen to be similar to another model of 
tr·unca.tion, na.mely the Tobit mCldel (Tobin, 1'7'58). The ma.in 
difference between this model and the Tobit model is that Tobit 
takes the point of truncation as known and fixed whereas in the 
Censored Regression Model the point of truncation is a stochastic 
variable to be estimated. 
Po9.ge 6 
X1 and X2 ar'e vect,;,r's of personal cho9.r·o9.cteristics, lAje(i) is the 
iTH agent's expected wage, i.e., the wage he or she would receive 
if v,lc,rl<ing, Wp(i) t·;:. the iTH agent's po9.r·ticipation wage, i . e. , 
v( i) are classical error terms, Wei) is the wage observed for 
agent i and 81 and 82 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
Gronau (1974) was the first to point out that if this is the way 
ob':;er'ved wages, vHi), ar'e generated then Or·dina.r·y Leo9.'::.t E;quar'es 
estimation of the first equation above, 
W(i) = We(i) = 81)<1 + u(i) 
lAd 1 1 be biased. Heckman (1976 and 1979) discusses this sample 
selection bias as a specification error in the expected wage 
equation and shows (1979) in particular that the specification 
error in this case is the failure to include the mean of the 
error term, conditional on the sample selection rule. Following 
Nelson we will est ima te the CRM ·as a ,::.ystem b::l the method elf 
maximum I ikelihood since ordinary least squares is clearly 
inappropriate for either of the wage equations shown. The 
important thing to nc.tice about thi·s model is tha.t, once II-le and 
Wp are properly and precisely defined, as they hopefully will be 
in the next section of this paper, then the CRM is the most basic 
and obvious specification for the generation of observed wage 
data in the neo-classical theory of labor supply. Consider 
diagram 1 on the following page wherein the partcicpation 
decision is illustrated for the standard case of a linear budget 
con,::.tr·aint in the incclme-leisur'e plo9.ne. Her'e Qo is leisure, Y i-:;· 
income a.nd T i,::. the total time o9.vo9.i lo9.ble fc,r a.l1clco9.tion between 
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income and leisure. Then, if M is the amount of non-labor and 
transfer income, we see the budget constraint to be: 
t·" + I.<~(T-G!o) = ... (. 
At wage rate Wi we find indifference curve Ul tangent at point A, 
where zero hours of work are offered and T hours of leisure are 
consumed. Since the marginal rate of substitution equals the wage 
rate Wi ~t such a tangency then W1 must be the value of time or 
the participation wage. Thus, 1 ... ·.I-8.ge gr' e.:;.. t er' than ~'·ll i·::. 
nece~ssary to induce participation. Addition.;..] point·;:; of 
equilibrium are seen at points Band C, each corresponding to a 
higher wage rate and generatin9 points on the labor supply curve 
whete positive hours are offered since W3 ) W2 ) W1. E'·./en i. f 
non-1 a.bor· inc ome t"1 i,;:, .?qu .9.1 to Z er' 0 the pa.r· tic i p.:;.. t i on I,o.)a.,;:e 
simply zero and we may continue to think of the bu t con-:::.tr·.;:..i n t 
above as a fairly general representation of a linear bu t 
c c.n ':;;. t r' .:;., in t in the neo-classical model where markets clear .:;..nd 
there is no involuntary unemployment. Clearly it i -:; a_ rnor' e 
difficult to choose a model for the generation of the 
observed wage distribution under the hypothesis of 
Certa.inl:.·' in'v'olunt .... r·;,1 unemplo>,'ment c-8.r·r· i e';:· (-,·.Iith it 
the notion of some additional constraint other than the bu t 
constraint and any complete specification must describe t hi,;:, 
con-str-.:3.int. In this paper we will avoid the issue of what the 
constraint might be in our model of involuntary unemployment. We 
have chosen an alternative th.8. t pro ec 1 !,J ch?'::;' "'-./01 un t B.r- :: .... " 
unemployment and that is about all we can say about the constant 
probabil ity model of unemployment j with one important exception. 
Or' din a.r· > .. , le·:;.. s t :::;qu ':;'.r- e';:· iJi an a.ppr· opr' i .:3. tee'::;, t i mao t or for' the 
expected wage equation in our model of involuntary unemployment 
since we have assumed that there is no sample selection blas. 
Thus our only wage equation in the constant probability model is 
the first wage equation of the CRM above: 
~·'l(i) :::: ~'le(i) =: E:l>:~l + u(i) 
iff i is employed. 
W(i) =: 0 otherwise. 
The iTH agent is unemployed with constant probability p, a.nd 
therefore this equation may be used to provide unbiased estimates 
oft h epa. r' ·:am e t e r' s 8 1. He li .. 1i 1 i c a. 1 1 t his con ';. t ·9. n t pro b a. b iii t ::/ 
mc .. :::lel the OlS model; by OlS model we will mean the probabil ity p 
of unemployment, the above wage equation and a liKelihood 
equation to be derived later for predicting employment status for 
a particular sample. liKewise, by the CRM model we will mean the 
system of equations previously introduced, the corresponding 
implicit selection r-ule determining employment status and 
probability of unemployment for a given agent and a corresponding 
1 i r.:e 1 i hCn:uj ec~ua. t i ::tn, also to be derived later, 
employment status for a particular sample. 
To apply the notions of how one might describe the nature 
of un emp 1 o:: ... men t b.;:..·;.ed on in i: o["m·:;., t ion a.bou t the ob'E:.er· ....... ed Il.Ja,ge 
d i ':E. t r' i 1:)1..1 "t i on both the CRM and OlS models will be estimated for 
the h·.,Io r' ':'.c i a.l groups, blacK and white. "A Pr-iori" we would 
e>~r:iec t the CRM model to do a better Job of predicting employment 
than the OlS model for whites and we would expect the OlS 
constant probability model to be better than the CRM for blacKs. 
Page S:"". 
The results presented in the final section of this paper tend to 
support that hypothesis. Unfortunately, the statistics involved 
in a comparison such as this are not always well def ined and 
certainly are not fully developed in this paper. Only one sample 
was used for estimation and clearly mul tiple sampling is in order 
if one wishes to use this procedure to make any strong statements 
about the nature of unemployment. Consequently the work presented 
here is offered as a methodological approach to the study of 
unempl c.ymen t. Even readers sympa. thet i c to the conc 1 usi ons of the 
particular estima.tiorl t.:) follc.f.;..1 should not interpr·et the reslJlts 
as a conclusive statement about the nature of unemployment for 
the particular sample used in estimation. 
Having given the necessary caveats with regard to 
interpretation we turn in the next section to the origins of the 
participation and expected wages in the neoclassical theory of 
labor supply. Section C discusses some of 
involved in estimating the OlS a.nd CRt1 model s usi ng the 
functional forms suggested by section 8. In section 0 the results 
of the various estimations and test procedures are presented and 
evaluated in light of the or' i gin a. 1 goals and propositions. 
Section E suggests some conclusions about the procedure and some 
directions for future work. Also included are a number of 
appendices containing some earl ier empirical work on the OlS wage 
equa t i ,:)n a.nd di·:.cu·:.si .:.ns c.f techn i cal i -:;.-:;·ues in est ima t i on. 
B. A f'lODEL OF LABOR SUPPL Y 
In order to precisely identify the participation and expected wages it 
is neceSsctry to aevelop a model of labor supply. In general there are three 
ways of dOLay turs. Only one will be used bere. For an excellent summary 
of these tnr:8e :.jeneral approaches see Abbot and Ashenfelter (976). Our 
approach SLaLts witu a direct utility function in income and leisure and 
then uses the irLst-order conditions for constrained maximization to derive 
labor sUPJ..'1.y. IU1S approach was chosen for wilat are larqely intuitive 
reasons. It seems to make sense that if one is qoing to discuss voluntary 
and involuntary benavior one ought to begin with a description of 
preferenCE;S. 
In tn~s Cdse our description of preferences is taken from stone's 
(1954) Llil€dr Bxpenditure System. It is the only expenditure system whose 
correspoaurnq atllity function satisfies the theoretical restrictions of 
adding-up, nomogellelty and. symmetry {D!::aton and !1uellbauer, 1980, p.6S). It 
also tae onLy Llnear expenditure system that can be derived from a 
classicZL.. at.Ll-l.ty iUHctioH !Gold.berger, L967). The qeneral form of t.Ile LES 
direct utl~ity fUllction is, 
~







>.2= o"Ql, •••• ,Qn) is the agent's consumption V'f:;ctor 
ii""{Hv,U1, •••• ,Bn) and 6=(30,81, ••••• ,3n) dre pard1ll2t,:::r vectors. 




W hen one of t.~H3 COiUIllO di ties, Qi is def i.ned to be leisure, sa y Qo, then the 
above f uuc tion is referred to as an auqmen ted .(f or: lc:i sULe) S to n e-Gear y 
utility .t'twct.l.on (Goldbel'qec, 1967). If all non-leisure commodities are 
aqqreqated rntJ oue, called income, then the function usuallY written 
10 
u= v (\2) = BoLn (Qo-Ho) + BLn (Q-H) 
where Q l.S income dnd H .is a single valued pacameter. 
This utility functl.on has a number of interesting properties that are 
consistent ~itn some intuitive notions about how preferences might be mapped 
into a cardl.oa.1 ordering. The fiest thing to notice is that the logar ithmic 
terms give the function diminishing marginal utility. In addition it is not 
defined where UO<UO or Q<H because the arguments of the log terms would then 
be negative. The quantities Ho and H can therefore be interpreted as 
n subsiste nce n quantl. ties of leisure and income respecti vel y, an d they serve 
as additl.ona.1 ~aeameters which make the functional form more flexible • .. 
Consider for example the pacameter H as a function of personal 
characteristics, 
H Ii) = Co+CZ (i) +e (i) 
where Z l.S a relevant set of its characteristics 
Co,C are parameters and 
e !i) l.S a classical error ter:m"'N~O, 0-} . 
Followi ny G L onii u (B7 3) this approach will be incorpor ated in to our 
estimation oi the participation wage. 
In partl.cular our maximization procedure parallels that of Leuthold 
(1968), expressLnq the budqet constraint in terms of income and time 
allocation ~dentl.ties and therefore bypassing issues of commodity demand. 
For this to De a valid procedure it is necessary to assume that relative 
prices are constant across the consumption bundles represented in our 
sample. 
Let the utility function be 3 
U= V!Qo,Q;= ALn(Qo-Ho)+Bln(Q-H) 
where 
Uo=T-L T=total time available, L=labor supply 
3The subscr1.pt .I.. w1.11 be dropped for: clarity of notation. 
11 
Q=~L.M d= non-labor income, W=the actual wage 
A+b=l, Hu, Hare parameters4 • 
substituting tile constraints directly into the utility function qives 
U= ALn[ {,r-L} -Ho] + BLn[ (liLHi) -H 1 
with the corresponding first order condition for maximization 
aU/aL = -A/(T-.L-Ho) + (BW}/{WL+M-R) = O. 
Be-arrang~nq dnd solving for L gives the labor supply fUDction 
L= H{'I-Ho) - (A/W) {l'1-H). 
Labor supply is seen to reach a maximum at BfT-Ho), i.e., B times the time 
. 
remaining after subtracting 'committed t leisure time. It varies up to this 
point as a Lonct~on of Wand l'1, increasing in Wand decreasinq in M. The 
participation wage is found by settinq L to zero: 
.d (T-tio) - (A/W) (M-H) =0 
and solv~ng tor tue participation wage Ip, givinq 
vJp= (A eM-d) ]I( B (T-Ho) ]. 
Thus our true laDor supply fUnction is now discontinuous at Wp, the 
participation w~ge, and is given by 
L= B(1'-Ho) - (A/i) (!!:i-H) for: W>Wp 
L= 0 ot.herwise. 
Now i.t one ~s not particularly interested in identifying the constants A,B 
and T-80 then it 1S possible to linearize the functional form bf the 
participativn wage 
wp= [A (til-d) )/(E(T-Ho) 1 
= {A/f B (I-Ho) ]} (t1-H) 
where estimation w~ll only allow identification of the coefficient 
A/fBCT-Ho} J as one number, say K. 
4The restriction A+E=1 is not particularly important, only serving to make 
the indifference curves associated with this utility function rectangular 
hyperbolds, assymptotic to the two positive asymptotes, Ho and H. The lower 
A is relative to B the flatter the indifference curves vill be; reducing the 
marginal rate ot sUDstitution. 
Allowing H to De a linear function of personal characteristics with a 
classical error terill 
then 
where if 
H = Co i- CZ + e 
Wp = K( M - Co - CZ - e) 
= -KCo + KM - KCZ - Ke 
- Eo + KM + EZ + u 
e-N (O,d) is a classical error term then 
u""'N (0, K9.-d) is also a classical erro.r ter ill. 
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Thus by sacr~Iicinq identification of some parameters we have a linear form 
for the partLcLpation wage that is a function of non-lanor income and 
personal characteristics. 
HavLoq derLved a simple linear form for the participation wage the next 
task is to i usti!y the proposed characterizd tion of the expected wage.. The 
procedure here follows closely that of Hall (1973) although the 
interpretation is somewhat different. Ball applies the concept of an 
expected wage to estimation of labor supply as a solution to the missing 
variables proDLem and a correction for measurement error, but does not 
;ustify hLS imputatLon of fitted values to the unemployed mem.bers of his 
samrle. JusLLtLcation of this procedure requires some rather stronq 
assumptions about the nature of unemployment that will be explored here. 
For an econometrLc j ustif iea tion of the e xpec ted ill aqe as an iustrum ental 
variables estimatur of the actual wage for the employed allowing unbiased 
estimation of theLr labor supply see Appendix I wh~re Ball's proof is 
duplicated. Recall the labor supply equation 
Ls= .d (T-tiO) - (A/Vi) (M-H) • 
This equation must De part of a two equation system describing supply and 
demand in the lanoe market, 
13 
.LS = Ls (~~"E) 
Ld=Ld(w"S) 
L=Ls=Ld 
where R ~nd S dre vectors of exogenous variables that may overlap and i is 
the actudl wage. 
Then 
1s !W,Hl =1d (W,S) =L 
may be so~ved ior the actual wage" W. By fitting the resulting equation 
over the members or the sample who have an observed non-zero wage we will 
obtain estlwates of the expected wage for the employed 5 • From this we can 
see that our expected wage equation may be thought of as a reduced form from 
a labor su~p~y dud demand system. 
Having more rully characterized the expected and participation wages 
the next task lS to discuss procedures for their estimation in tbe context 
of the OL5 and CEM models. 
5Actually, the appearance of the wage as a reciprocal in the labor supply 
equation maKes solviny for the expected wage a little less casual than 
descri be(l aJ.JOve. Tilis non-linea r it y in the lailor supp 1 y eq'ua ti on prohibits 
a linear form tur the expected wage as a reduced form of the simultaneous 
system. conse~uently, when choosing a linear (in the parameters) form for 
the expected Wa48 one may prefer to think of the expected wage as a general 
instrumental variab~es estimator for the system. This does not imply that 
Ballts proof ot unbLasedness in application of this estimator to the 
expected wage for the employed justifies imputation of an expected wage to 
the unem~~oyeQ DY retaining the coefficients from this procedure. 
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C. ESTIjATING THE WAGE EQUATIONS 
Est~mdtLnq tue waqe e~uation for the 015 model is straightforward since 
the assumpt~on ~s taat the expected waqe is similarly determined for both 
emploYEd dnd ulLemp.~oyed. Therefore it is sufficient to fit thf~ observed 
waqe for worKers to a linear combination of observed characteristics, then 
take the coefflcients estimated and use them to find a tfltted f waqe for 
nen-workers. In this case a log-linear functional form was chosen with the 
loq of tue waye on the left hand side. This is the form predominant in the 
literature, litting percent chanqes instead of levels. Two versions of this 
waqe equatLon were estimated. The first is a more detailed specification 
with eight regressors~ Results of this fully specified wage equation are 
reported in Appendlx II. The equation used in tbe body of the work was 
estimatei on a SUDset ot the regcessocs fcom the fully specifed equation 
that wece cnosen according to their significance in the fully specified 
model. L~ was necessary to tcim down the wage equation for the 015 so that 
the OLS expected waqe equation would be comparable to the CRj expected wage 
eguat~on. Cast In terms of ccmputer resources prohibited using the full 
specificdtlon ~n tne CRM model. Space and time requirements were found to 
rise rap~aly witn tDe number of parameters to be estimated in the CRM~ !n 
fact the model estllliated was the largest possible witn the technique used on 
the 0 ber 1. ~n Col19'-,]8 Xerox S ig ma- 9 ope ra Ling system 6. 
The 0L5 model ~lso has a more interesting interpretation than that of a 
simple linear regression. It can h8 expressed in t8rms of a probabilistic 
model of IdDor tOLCS participation with a corresponding likelihood function. 
Before tnis Lnterpretation can be given ~t is helpful to derive the 
likelihoud function for the CRH and detail the assumptions und.;3r which it is 
60ther methods of estimation may have proven to be more efficient. For a 
more detdl~ed dlscussion of computer techniques, software available and 
hardware resource constraints with regard to the mechanics of estimating the 
CRM likeiinooa function see Appendix III. 
estimated. 
Recall tne CHM model of wage determination 
we=B1X:1 :to u 
tJp=B2X2 + v 
~ = We ~ff We>Wp 
=0 oUler wise. 
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Ordinary least squares is clearly not the appropriate estimating tecbnique 
even for tne expected wage equation. Because of the sample selection bias 
which is ds;:;umed to exist in this model, u will he correlated with X1 when 
We is closa to wp ~n the non-censored sample. When We, which is a function 
of X1# is close to Wp, more of the observed wage distririution is truncated 
than when it is fartber away_ consequently the level of truncation, which 
affects ~ the erro r term, will .be a fu nction of Xl. Heckman (1 S 76) points 
out that in yenera~ one cannot sign the direction of the bias introduced by 
this correLation. Goldberger (1975) has shown that under certain conditions 
one can . l..dcln tif y tae sign of the bias if one also has t a pr iori' infor mation 
about siqns of tue coefficients in the model's structural equations. 
Ordinary least squares is impossible for the participation wage equation for 
the simpLe reaSOD tnat there are no observations on the dependent variable. 
However WB may use the inequality determining participation to derive a 
likelihood tunct~on incorporating all the information available. First 
divide tue sample ~nto two sub-samples, 51 containinq the unemployed and 52 
containing the employed. Then in sample 51 we would like to maximize the 
probabillty tor ~dch i that W(i)=O. In 52 we would like to maximize the 
probability .for: eacti. i that 10) (i) >Wp (i) <=>W (i) >0 and W {i) =We (i) =B 1X 1 {i) +u (i) " 
In sample S 1 , 
Now if 
PI: (W=O) = Pr {We<Wp) =Pr (B lX 1+u<B2X2+v) 
= Pr!u-v<U2X2-BlX1). 
).. !L 
:.1"'1:4(OltJi) and v"'N(O/O~) 
then 
Thus Ute prui:.;dDil.l.tythat 14 (i) equals zero is gi ven bY 
where F l.S the ~ ,0, 1) cumulative distribution function. 
In tue set 52 we wish to take advantage of the information that not 
only is '~11.} non-zero but it is observed and equal toWe,i). 
Let G(u,v)=~'We-B1Xl,Wp-B2X2) be the bivariate normal de~sitv of u and v. 
We are interested l.U 
Pr,w=~e~Wp AND W=We=B1Xl+u) for i element of S2 
= Er( v<W-i32X2 AND u=w-B1Xl). 
(W-D2X2 
~G(~-B1X1IV)dV. 
The likell.nood function for the whole sample is found ov combining tbe 
likelihoods LOL each sub-sample 'living 
L (El,B;!, 0;, ~ COY (u,v) jXl,X2,W) = 'lYf vJ-I3;L'i-. J).... 11 f~2X;;:B1Xy 1/ G{W-B1X1.v)dv. 
'5.1- ~'~ 
This is not dil edSY iunction to evaluate. One simp Yl.o'l assumption is 
that of zero COVarl.dnce. In the case of zero covariance cr 
the likell.nood function of the second sub-sample factors because the 
assumption OL zero covariance means that u and v are independent. 
Then, 
2r(w>Wp AND W=B1X1+u)=Pr(W>Wp)Pr(W=B1X1+u) 
F I (W-B lX 1\ F (W-B21.:2\ 




where P' is the Jeusity function corresponding to the distribution function 
F. Thus oue sample likelihood becomes 
L (B 1, B2" 0; I Oil Xl, A 1., w) = 
"=!Tff(t>2X2-B1Xl\TJF~-B2X2\F' (W-B1Xl\ !1ldj ). 
I / \ No;(J.+([~ / \: o-~ J \ cr; :.; 
.51 ,.f~ 
This simple~ liKelihood function was the one employed in estimation of 
81,82,0;- and O"'"J-.-.consequently some justification of the assumption of zero 
covariance ~s in order. If the model is correctly specified there is no 
obvious reason why the errors of the participation and expected wage 
~quations should ~e co~related. For example, if uCi) is positive and we 
have explained alL systematic variance in WeCi) then i is simply a 'lucky' 
indi vid ua L There is no reason to think that luck in the labor market 
should cause us to systematically under or overestimate a lucky individual's 
particip~tioD wage. A similar informal argument can be made for the case of 
a negative u(i). Likewise we can proceed from errors in the Wp equation and 
argue tha t a g~ven error in the Wp equation would not allow one to predict 
the erroc in tae We equation. In addition, the assumption of zero 
covariance a~lo~s us to choose overlapping sets of regressors for the 
particip aticn and ex pee ted wage equa tions wi t.nou t s:3.crifi cinq iden tif ication 
of the par'ameters B2 (Nelson, 1974, p.19). 
To see now tae ULS model may be characterized as a prubabilistic model 
of employment Lt LS helpful to first consider the C8M model ~hen we discard 
observatJ..ons on w ii) and simply retain knowledge of employment status. Then 
OUI: model says, .here Yei) is i' s employment status; 
'itL)= D with probability P eX) unemployed with probability l-P ex) employed 
where P (X) is yLVen as before, P (X) = Pr (weOip) =Pr (\rl=O) = 
P (Q2~2~B '.X 1) • 
1 8 
The like~Luoo~ tunction for this simplified version of the CR~, continuinq 
to assume COVlu,V)=O is then 7 
L (B1,b2, 0;, 0iIX1"X2) = 
j1lFfo,;:'(2-B1X11 1][ 1-F~2x2-B1x1\ 1 I ~ N&."- facik- 1 l ~ Ncr"-t(T.,"- ! I :'"- <' I ~ JL v 
Now. pictur~ug the OLS model in a similar manner ~e see that the model can 
be descrlDed In terms of employment status as 
y (J.) = 
{~ " with probability 1-P emp~oyed 
wita probanility P unemployed 
where P is constant for all J.. Then employment status in the OLS model is a 
simple Dernoulli trial with fixed probability P, the best estimator of which 
is the r2~~tlve frequency of unemployment, 51/[S1+S2)1 or more briefly nlN, 
where N l S Sci lfip .... 8 Slle and n is the Ii umber une mployed. 
the sample In the OLS model is then 
".n (1 . I"~') IN -l) i H/d} . .- {n l~ 
The liKelihood of 
Incorporating the loformatioD on the observed waqe into the CLS likelihood 
function ~llows us to characterize the OLS aod CEM likelihood fUDctions as 
similarly dS pO~5i~le. For the JIS model, 
L(B1,6; ,n,NIX1,X2} = 
1/([1 ). / 1.1r [1- (n/N) lP' (~-;2X 1) (1/0;) 
:.5.1.. ~i_ '., I 
= (n/Nln [ 1 - (n/N) t-'17F t (w- B 1 X 1) (1/0; ) • 
Jd-. "0; ) 
7This function ~s a superficially appealing approach to estiillat~on of the 
CRM because of its relative simplicity, especially if we are cnly interested 
in the particlpat10n decision. However, inspection shows the parameters to 
be ideo fled o~ly up to a scale factor of proportionality (rscall that 
OJ c.nd CT"s... must. Le estimated). For more on the problems of indentification 
in this clabs of models see Nelson (1974). Somethinq Wt~ will do with this 
likelihood L5 to plug in the parameter estimates from the full CEM 
likelihood lD order to evaluate the likelihood of employment status alone 
without lDcluding data on the observed wage for the employed. 
19 
Ideally we WOUl.d lil'u:;: to ne aDle to compare the CRi"l and the 01S models with 
the aid uL a L0cmal hypothesis test. The most appealing approach would be 
to consider the OL5 model as a constrained subset of the CRM model, with 
corLespoHd~lL'; null uypothesis that 01S is true aqainst the alternative 
hypothesls that the CRM is true. The test statistic would then be the 
likelihood [atlo statistic. Therefore it is necessary to ask; is the OLS 
model in fact a SUDset of the CRM model? It turns out that it is not. 
Consider the relevant probability measures in the CBM model 
Pr(w=O)= F(B2X2-B1X~ 
\: • /o-0l1 c-~ IY(, ~ 
and 
Pr{W)O AND W=We)= Pr{W>Wp AND W=We) 
=F (W-;;~~2) Ft ~-~x y (1/0;) 
and in tile CLS model 
Pr nJ=O}:::; (n/N) 
Pr (14.,>0 Al~D W=We) = [1- {n/N} 1Ft ~-~X1) (i/o;}. 
Letting ulN te equal to the constant probaoility P we see that for 01S to be 
a const,rd.l.ned 3UD3et. of the CRr1 t,here mu,st exist SOfUt:3 Pdr:a!l1et.{~r:s E 1$ 32; a; , a; 
such thd.t 
r a.ll i 
anu 
l-P for all i. 
RemembecLnq that X1 and X2 are large matrices of dimension nUilloer of 
coeffic nts by numDer of observations it becomes apparent that the first 
equality wi~~ De true only for 81=0 and B2=0 for all Bls in 81 and B2. If 
B2 is 0 then the seGond equality requires that W constant for all i since 
the 3GCOiid equal.l.t¥ deqenerates to F {W/O""",d equalinq a constant 1-P and o.i is 
20 
constant tor all i. Consequently, at least for the time being, it is 
necessary to look tor some informal means of comparison between the 015 and 
the CRM models. Siace the two models were estimated separately for racial 
groups taesa tests are more informative than one might think. Consider the 
hypothesis that ior blacks unemployment is random and for whites 
unemploYillent is voluntary and given by the CRM decision rule, i.e., those 
who are not working have chosen to do so because their expected waqe fails 
to exceed their participation wage. To examine tbis hypothesis the 
following stat~st~cs were computed for each racial qroup and informal 
comparisons were made" These statistics are th.e mean squared error of the 
wage equat~ons, goodness of fit of the CBM functional probabilities to the 
OLS constant pronaoility and the simplified log likelihood for employment 
status at 8st1mdted parameter values. A fourth statistic for goodness of 
fit of tae CRM is8 
Z= ~ it (i) -P (X) }ji: {P (X) r 1-P (I) » 
I VN' f 
where Y(L)LS lor 0 for its employment status. 
If we knew the true parameter vectors this statistic would be dis·tributed 
NCO,1). rio we Vf.;:L we onl y have estimates for B 1, B2 O'i and c.r;.. of which PCX) is 
a function. Because of this a fairly complex correction to this statistic 
is required usilig tne variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameter 
values. For reasons of time and diminishing marginal returns this test is 
set aside for tuture work 9• The statistic for goodness of fit of the CBM 
proLabilities ot unemployment to the constant OLS probability of 
""Vd-
unemployment is constructed like a ~ statistic, however it is not 
SNote that the notation PCX) is a fUDction of each characteristic vector 
Xii) and is mednt to imply PCX!i») .. 
9Actually this stat~stic was computed without the correction for estimates 
of the parameters. For the record the results are reported in the next 
section. The value of this statistic for both white dnd blaCK is out in the 
tail of the distr~butioD. It is likely however that introduction of the 
correction wou~d bring the values closer to the center of the distribution. 
'1/02-. distr ibut ed I'- The formula used here is 
LU P [X)-P]c2.;P} = Q. 
/ 
The mean squ~red error of the OLS model is given by 
~ [ y {l.) - p ]..t IN 
I 
since E[ Y (i) 1= P 
where Y (1) lS elli~loyment status. 
For the CRL'l model tue mean squared error: is gi ven DV 
2: [y eii - P eX} ]~ IN 
I 
since E[Y{i) 1= P (X) " 
Often two mean squared errors may be compared formally with an F-test on 
'1/0>-
their ratio as eaca is distributed ~ • However, as before with the 
likelihoou rat10 test, in this case we run into the problem of identifying 
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the hypothesis to De tested. Because the OLS model 1S not nested in the CRS 
model an F-test LS Lnappropriate. A possible solution to this problem is 
the estimation of a "supermodel" in which both the CRM and OLS models are 
nested, if such a model exists. Another approach that may bear fruit in the 
future is the derivation of the distribution of the likelihoods for the two 
models so tnat their difference or ratio may be compared. The last method 
used here to evaluate the two models in terms of their relative performance 
across rdcLal groups is the calculation of log likelihoods for the 
probability of employment status from the two models. For the CIS model 
this requ1red ca~cu~ation of 
Loq L(n,NJ= nLogen/Ii) + (N-n)Log[1-(n/N) 1 
and for the CRM, 
Log L (El, b2, (j" O"""o"lJX 1,X2)= 
L. Log E' (B2X2- B1X 9-t- LLOg[ l-f~~X2-B1Xy 1 
..f 1. '\ .AI 0;-..2. ... O"";C S :J-. IV OJ..2 ... oi-
at estimated parameter values. 
Results ior these procedures along with coefficient estimates for the OL5 
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and CRM models are reported in tbe next section. 
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D. RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATIONS 
Before descr1Ding the results a discussion of the data is in order. 
The sample is a. subset of the National Longitudinal survey data 011 men aged 
45-59 in 1966, tor wbom observations on the wage were available or wbo were 
listed as unemployed by Current Population Survey definition. The sample 
excluded ruen who never worked, men paid by piece rate, men self-employed and 
volunteer ~orKers. This selection process also removed a number of 
unexplained missinq sample points and reduced the uncensored sample size of 
5020 to 3705. Of tue 1315 missing observations, about 430 are missing 
because their labor force status did not describe them as eligible for an 
hourly wage dnd 8d5 are missing because of other factors in the selection 
process as described above. Estimation of the model further reduced the 
sample S1ze, dS cases were removed for which one or more variables wa.s 
missing. The f1nal sample size was 2429 white and 1076 black for a grand 
total ot 3505. Tbe mean and median wages for the employed members of this 
hardy group are <.j~ven below: 
GROUP MEAN MEDIAN 
white 3.51 3. 12 
black 2.22 2. 10 (black and 'other') 
Total 3. 12 2.84 
Except in the case of the fully specified waqe equation discussed in 
Appendix II the sample was furtber reduced by random samplinq so that the 
core space c€Quirements for the program that estimated the CRM would not be 
unmanageabLe ( see Appendix III ). The final estimations of the C8M and the 
OLS were done on two samples, one of 847 Whites, 36 of whom were unemployed, 
and one at 846 blacks, 29 of whom were unemployed. Sampling weights were 
introduced into the likelihood functions so that they would estimate in the 
context of the correct ratio of unemployed to employed. Likewise, any time 
the relat~v€ freguency of unemployment was calculated it was done on the 
basis of the relative freq~ncy in the uncensored sample. 
The results for the expected wage equation are presented in Table 1 
below 10 • On tue following page Ta~le 2 presents the results of the 
correspond~ng CRM ~stimdtion of the participation wage. Table 3 contains 
the statist~cs for comaprison of the CRM and OLS models described in the 
last sect~on. 
lONota tUdt coek£Lc~ents are of the form LOGlB). 
24 
Table 1 
EXPECTED WAGE tJUATION FOR WHITES: 
OLS 
variable C08ificient T-statistic 
CONSTANT 5. 1 e:) 
HEALTH O. b20 3.85 






-0.00b46 -1. 73 
O.OSS1 11.75 




STU ERROR REG=.44 











0.01136 7 .• 28 
F-STATISTIC= 91.95 
[(- [JARED= .36 
STJ ERROR REG=.41 
CEM 
Coefficient T-statisic 
5. 177 160 .• 59 
0.1618 12.23 





MAXIrllJi'i .LIKELIliOOD ES'IIi'1l,TE 
OF STD ERROR OF REG= .4384 
(T-statistic=160.59) 







MAXIM:Hl LIKELIHCDD ESTH1ATE 
OF STD ERROR OF REG=.4075 
(T-statistic=73.69) 
Talll e 2 
PARTICIPATION WAGE EQUATION FOR WHITES 
variable Coefficient T-statistic 
CONSTAN T 2. 182 1.08 
MAR.STAT. -0.0555 -0.109 
(1=married,2=not mar-ried) 
NO.DEP'S -0.00254 -0.0296 
(dependen ts) 
TRANSFERS 0.00221 1. 19 
(food stamps, unemployment compensation, welfare and public assis.) 
ASSETS -0.000055 -0.00841 
(Family and Business) 
EDUCATION 









MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE 
OF STD ERROR OF REG=1.31 IT-statistic=1.27) 








~AXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE 
OF STD ERROR OF REG= 5.0 {converqed at a boundary,~=.78} 
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Table 3 11 
WHITE BLACK 
STATISTIC OLS CRM OLS CRM 
1) GOODNESS OF FIT 113. 7 15.7 
(OLS witl~ CRt'! 
for prob~bil~t~es) 
.0414 .0376 .0331 .03377 
(for: probdililities; 
3) LOG LIK ELHWOD -186.2 -155.6 -132.7 -152.7 
,of probaDll~ties) 
4)LCG LIKELlhOOD -1534.0 -787.0 
(from fUl.l CaL"l) 
5)UNCOBRECTED NORMAL 
'rEST (CRM only) 6.4 11.8 
Regardless of the hypothesis about how the eBM results should compare 
with the OLS results there is no getting around the fact that the estimates 
of the part~cipation wage are not very good. No doubt this is partly a 
result of the CRM estimdting procedure which is very sensitive to parameters 
used in toe numerical algorithm such as increment halving dnd boundary 
constraints. In dddition choice of initial values was very important. The 
initial values procedure used here was cumbersome, involving preliminary OLS 
and Probit est,l.lnation in the manner sUggested by Nelson (1974). For a more 
detailed discussion of this procedure see Appendix III. Another factor 
contributing to tne high standard errors of the coeffcient estimates in the 
llThere are a lot of mean squared errors floating about and it is important 
to distinguish them. The estimated M.S.E. of tables 1 and 2 is computed by 
the CRM re4ress~ou program and is the estimated M.S.E. of the entire eBM 
system. Also in Tacies 1 and 2 the values given as maximum likelihood 
estimates of standard error of the regression are the estimated parameters, 
cr, and 00.., one ior each equation. The mean squared errors in table 3 arafor 
differences in actual and expected probabilities of unemployment predicted 
by the two models. Tbey are given by the formulas shown earlier. 
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participatloB wage equatioo is simply the meager information available on 
which to Dase an estimation» The CRM had no trouble estimating the expected 
wage witn a hign degree of confidence. 
Ins~ection of the results in terms of the original hypothesis shows the 
evidence to Le mlxed. The signs of the coefficients on the expected waqe 
equation do not change between CR~ and OLS estimation for either race~ 
However. ior wn~tes the magnitude of the coefficients for the CRM aod OLS 
estimation at tae expected wage is much closer than it is for blacks~ This 
might inu1caLe tnat samfle selection is more important for blacks than for 
whites, contrary to the original hypothesis that black unemployment is 
randomly dra~n ~nile white unemployment is voluntary. This difference in 
maqnitude is fa1rly weak evidence especially when one considers the fact 
that the q~eatGst d~fferences in 01S and CRM estimates for blaCKS are found 
tor those coeiiiclent estimates in which the least confidence is warranted. 
These are tue hed~th and age coefficients. The black 015 health coefficient 
is negative dnd tnls clearly is a nonsensical result since the health 
variable ranged tram 1= some health effect to 2=no health effect cn work. 
The T-statistic for this estimate is almost zero and the sign in this case 
can be attr~Luteu to sampling errOL. In Appendix II the fully specified 
large sam~le mOdel produced a positive health coefficient for Dlacks, though 
again it 15 not 5~qnificantly different from zero. There is no denying that 
the coeft~clent remains negative in the CRM estimation ahd tbe level of 
sign ance ~ncreases dramatically. This suggests another explanation, that 
the model ~s mis-specified. The other main difference between 01S ::ind CRt1 
estimation of tue expected wage equation for blacks is in the age and 
education coeLticieuts. The signs don't change but the CR~ estimates are 
somewhat smallec 1D absolute value. In both models the age coefficient 
estimates are less significant than the other regressors except for some 
health coeitic~ent estimates. 
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The neqat~ve slgn on age for both races in both models is an 
interestinq result. It was robust under a number of 015 specifications. It 
seems that WhdLBver returns to age there are for hourly wa~e earners come 
from incre~sEd lob tenure, and that once this variable is added aqe is free 
to show ltd tLue effects. Variations in specification desiqned to test this 
result are discussed in Appendix II. The remaining estimates for tbe 
expected wage equations seem to make sense in both the CRM and OL5 models. 
The overaLL f:dttern in the coefficients point up some interesting 
1I",,~~.e 
differences l.D DlacK and white ~ determination. While education and iob 
tenure are slgnitlcant positive factors for both races they are less so for 
blacks, where type of area of residence is the drivinq factor. 
ThE;: part1.Cipatlon wage estimates in Table 2 ace ver:y :lifficult to 
interpret and a nUillDer of stories may De told about them. For both Dlacks 
and whltes the Pd~tLcipation wage is low relative to the expected waqe. In 
fact there aLe no samrle points, unemployed or otherwise, for whom the eR! 
was successtul in i1.tting the log of the participation waqe above the log of 
the expected wage. This does not necessarily imply that there is no one for 
whom wp > ~e. To determine the fitted ie and Wp values req res more than 
taking toe exponential of log values because of tbe bias introduced by the 
ncn-linearitv or tne logarithmic transformation. The correction is slightly 
complex i see N8yman and Scott, 1960) and requires estimates of 0; and ~to 
get correct811 '2st.1.illates even d.t the means of the independent variables. It 
was not ~oss~£.1.e to get any 1:e1iao1e corrected estimates of black 
participation and expected wages because the estimate of CT.;t converqed to a 
boundary coostra~nt and it is therefore unlikely that the estimate is very 
close to the true value. 
k nUillDer of variations io the numerical algorithm parameters were tried 
for both [aces to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to these factors. 
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The white ~esults were not very sensitive to these variation3. However, in 
the blaci\. participation wage equation It was found that either the ffa.. term 
always cOHverg'3d to tile positive maximum boundary or the constant term 
always converged to the negative minimum boundary. This suggests the 
interestuq l.nterp:cetation that for blacks the participati:)n waqe is 
vi[-tually zero. If the participation wage is zero for blacks the constant 
term should converge to a very negative number as the wage tries to reach 
zero. Llkewise ~f the constant is free to go as low as l.t wants tben the 
error of the equation could be expected to converge at its maximum since the 
wage can only reaca zero in the logarithmic transfo:cmation wben tbe 
determinlng var~aDles reach negative infinity. This interpretation also 
belps explain tae ~ow T-ratios for the coefficients in the black 
participdt~on waqe eguation. ie cannot reject the hypothesis that all of 
the coefLlcients dLe zero. The zero participaticn wage explanation also 
helps explain the counter-intuitive result that for blaci\s more education 
decreases the part~cipation wage. If the true coeffecients are zero and the 
constant 4ou~d De infinitely negative if we let it then the siqns on the 
estimated coatI ients are mea~ingless. 
The Pdrarnete~ estimates for the white participation equation suggest 
that the wlllte partlcipation wage may be positive, but there is no 
conclusive evidence either way~ The constant is positive and alonq with the 
coafi nt on tLallsfer income is the most significant determinant of 
participatlun wa~es. Like the equation for Dlacks the T-ratios are low and 
do not encoura~e confidence in the estimates. An encouraginq difference is 
the betteL estima~e of ~ for whites than for blacks. 
"'-
Thouqh not 
statistically siqaificant, the results for whites are somewhat better 
overall tnan for blacks in the participation wage. The m03t disturbing 
result for wnite participation wages is the negative coefficient on assets. 
However the f-ratlo for this estimate is the worst of all the estimates aDd 
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is virtual~y zero. Gnce again the evidence is weak, but it seems to suggest 
that if the partLc1pation wage is significant for anyone it is significant 
for whites. If tne participation wage is indeed relevant for VI hites and 
irrelevant for ulacks then the hypothesiS that white unemployment is more a 
product at vol~ntdry decisions than black has received some support. 
Turn1n~ to the comparative statistics of Table J a definite pattern 
presents itselt. The first statistic indicates that the fit of estimated 
pro.tabili ties from the CR M to the OLS rela ti ve freq uencies is mu cll better 
for blaCKS. Interpretation of this result is highly pronlematic; are the 
black CRct results close to the 'true' OLS results or vice versa? with 
regard to the mean squared errors of the probabilities from the two models 
the expected inequality holds. For whites the CRt'! did a better ;ob of 
predictinq employment status than did the OLS model. For olacks the 
opposite i3 true, the 01S has a lower mean sguared error than the CRM. The 
loq likelinoods for employment status are consistent with the first two 
results. For whites CRM predictions of employment status are more 'likely' 
then the OLS pred1ctions and for blacks the opposite is true. However, the 
likelihood of the full CR!:'l is higher for blacks than it is for whites. One 
explanat10n fOL this is the better overall fit of the black expected wage 
equation wiuch appears in the CRM. It is also possible for the CRM to do a 
better ioo of expLaining wages for blacks than for whites and still do a 
worse iOD relat1ve to the OLS model. That is, the CRM is a better explainer 
for blaCKS tnaD for whites but the OLS is a better explainer for blacks than 
-F IF t-It 
the CRM. The fo~rth statistic is the uncorrected normal test of the CRM. 
For both races the statistic's values are high enough to reiect the CRM, 
however the reiection is stronger for blacks than for whites. Introduction 
of the correction for parameter estimates mentioned in footnote nine would 
probably br1llg both races' statistic value closer to the center of the 
distribution w1thout chanqing their relationship to each other. 
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These results a~e admittedly inconclusive. Nonetheless it seems that 
what evidence "there is supports a case fo~ the notion that white adult 
unemployment in 1966 ~as a product of deliberate decision while this is less 
likely foe blacks. Conversely, it seems mo~e likely that black unemployment 
was a ran do ill, in vol Ull tary phenomenon than it does for whi tes. 
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E. CCNCLUSIOHS AND FUTURE WORK 
Although it is not entirely satisfactory, the procedure proposed bere 
for chardcteriz~llg unemployment appears to be an interesting and useful 
approach. some wedK evidence has been given for differences in the nature 
of unempLoyment across races. clearly, more work is necessary before 
anything can be said with confidence. The econometrics of the censored 
regression mode~ are complex and cumbersome. In order to improve this 
situation some worK has been done on simpler estima tors for this class of 
models. See, tor example, Heckman (1976) wherein a simplified estimator is 
proposed that allows estimation by least squares and Probit analysis. A 
recent revLsion and clarification of this article is HeCkman (1979) wherein 
a two-stage est~mdtor is applied to the problem. 
In HeCKman (1976) a censored variable estimation is performed for wbite 
married women. Heckman compares his estimator with the maximum likelihood 
and OL5 estimators. He does not, however investiqate a breakdown by racial 
groups. HeckmdD £1979) points out that while his results do not allow 
reiection of tbe null hypothesis that sample selection is an unimportant 
phenomenon Gronau (1974) found significant selectivity bias. Both Gronau 
and Heckman concentrate on selectivity bias as an econometric missing 
variable or spec~tication problem and not as a tool for understanding the 
type of unemployment Observed. Heckmanfs estimates of the samp1!3 likelihood 
for the hypotnesis of sample selection and the hypothesis of no sample 
selection are almost identica112 • If one considers women to be a group that 
suffers d~scrimination this tends to support the notion that for groups for 
whom unemployment is an involuntary phenomenon the OL5 will do at least as 
good a iOD of predLcting employment status as the censored regression model. 
12The 1i~elihood for the hypothesis of sample selection is -5,778 and for 
the hypothesis of no sample selection is -5,783 ( Heckman, 1976, Table 3). 
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An ~mportant contribution to the type of study undertaken here would be 
the development at statistics enabling one to compare apples and oranges 
like the OLS and censored regression model in a rigorous and meaningful way. 
To this end two suggestions are offered. A useful approach may be the 
development of a distribution theory for the likelihood equations generated 
by this type ot comparison. Their individual distriDutions should qive rise 
to a distribution useful for the construction of hypothesis tests on their 
differences. Another valuable contribution would be the identification of a 
more general model in which both the CaM and OLS are nested. 
A number of interesting modifications should be made to the economic 
foundations of the model. One of the most interestinq would be the 
introauction of time preference and search behavior. In this caSES the CRM 
might de.3criDe tue unemployed as making decisions based on the diffecence 
between the present value of the expected waqe and the present value of the 
participdtion wage. ()Ve.II" .,.,"""t.. 
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APPENDIX 1: Tne Expected Wage as Instrumental Variables Estimator. 
Hall's procedure for imputing a wage to the unemployed and removing the 
bias from measurement error begins by considering a simple labor supply 
function. For exam~le, 
1 = Bo + B1W + u 
where W is the actaal wage for agent i and u is the iTH stochastic error 
term. In many cross-section studies the observed waqediffers from the true 
wage by some random measurement error: 
w = W + v 
where w is the ~TH observed wage and v is the error of measurement. We 
assume that v ~s uncorrelated with i , i.e., that there are no systematic 
errors in measuring the wage. Substituting the latter equation into the 
former g~ves 
L = Bo + Blw + u - B1v because w = w - v 
= Bo + Blw + e where e = u - Bl' 
which is what we would estimate without correcting for measurement error. 
The problem of measurement bias arises because v is positive in w = W + v 
and negative in e = u - Blv causing wand e to be negatively correlated, 
violating one ot the classical assumptions that errors are uncorrelated with 
regressors. Th~s negative correlation will bias B1 downwards, 
underestiffidting tne labor supply response to the waqe (Hall,1973). However, 
this proulem as well as the problem of a lack of observations on the wage 
rate for the unemployed may be resolved in one procedure by addinq an 
iDstrumenta~ varLaoles estimator to the labor supply equation, where the 
instrumeuts are the (exogenous) determinants of the wage rate. The wage 
determination equation says that the ~served wage is a function of personal 
chaLacter~~tics, a random disturbance for measurement error, v and a second 
error term, f. The resulting wage eguation is 
W = Ao + A111 + ••••••••• AnXn + p + v 
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= w' ... p + v 
where X = X1, ••••• ,In is a vector of observed personal characteristics. 
Applying OLSU to th~s equation yields an equation that will provide an 
imputed Wd'1e: 
w' = Ao'+Al'I1 + ~ •••••• + An'Xn 
where the A' s are estimated coefficients. 
From the two equations 
L - Bo ... Blw + u - S1v and 
w = w' ... p + v 
we get 
L = Bo + B1f w' ... p + v ] ... u - B1v 
= Bo ... B 1[ w' + p ) + u 
= Bo ... B lv I ... Z 
where 
z = Blp ... u. 
Estimation ot the last labor supply equation, 
L= Bo + B 1 iii' + Z 
by OLSQ LS a~propriate if the imputed wage is used for all observations in 
the sample 13 and will provide consistent and unbiased estimates of the 
parameters of the labor supply equation (Hall,1973, pp. 1 10- 1 1 1) • 
131i the Lmputed wage were to be used only for those without an observed 
wage and the ouserved wage for those with an observed waqe, then the 
appropriate estimator would be weighted least squares, with less weight on 
those sample po~nts using the imputed wage because VAR!z) > VAR (u). 
APPENDIX II: The Fully Specified Expected Wage Equation. 
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The results tor this regression are reported separately for black and white 
below: 
CA) FOR WHITES, WOl: king o.r if i th a iob not worki nq by CPS def ini tioRS 
Dependent Variable=Ln{hourly wage} 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR 
HEALTH .. 09 .02 
AGE ! -. 07) .002 
EDUC • 03 .003 
SKILL .05 .006 
RES (-.03) .003 
RCU1 .. 005 .0005 
TENURE .008 .0008 
UNEM .002 .0004 
COEF 
F-statistic=197.5 
R-squared= • .36 








101 • .3 
35.2 
The regression ~s highly significant overall and all coe£ficients are 
significantly different from zero at any reasonable level of significance. 
The results for blacks had a similar basic pattern: 
(B) FOR BLACKS, same labor force qroup as in above table 
Dependent Variable=Ln[hrlywage) F-statistic=97.0 
R-squared=.]9 
Std. Error Reqr= .. 40 
VAlUABLE COEFFICI ENT STD. ERROR COEF F-statistic 
HEALTH .04 .03 1. 7 
AGE (-.01) .003 14.0 
EDUC .015 .004 16.0 
SKILL .OJ .009 9.3 
RES (-.09) .005 288.7 
RCAN .004 .001 10.0 
TENURE .009 .001 51.9 
UNEM .002 .0006 16.2 
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In this set of req~essions there are a number of interesting results. 
Education is hi.ghly significant but certainly not the most significant 
determinant of wages, especially in the case of black workers. It would 
seem that the most ~mportant factor in the determination of black wages in 
1966 was res~dency by population density. Another interesting result is the 
siqnificance of the tenure variable in both reqressions. A surprising 
result is the sign of the coefficient on the unemployment variable whic4 has 
a robustly positive sign under all variations in regressors and functional 
form tried. This suggests the counter-intuitive conclusion that the higher 
the unemployment rate in the respondent's labor market, the bigher a wage he 
could expect. One explanation for this is a leftward shift in supply in the 
high unem}:loyrue.nt areas, in which case some observed unemployment must be 
voluntary. Another explanation is the negative zero-order correlation 
between population density and unemployment (-.12), that is, as population 
density decreased, unemployment fell, therefore high unemployment is 
correlated with high population density which is correlated with high wages 
and the two variables, UHEM and RES are picking up some of the same eff~cts. 
Retention of UNEI:1 in the regression and removal of the population density 
variable, RES ra~ses the significance of t.ne coefficient on UMEM, supporting 
the idea that these two variables proxy some of the same effects~ There 
were some proolems with multi-collinearity, though nothing severe enough to 
warrant re-specification. The highest zero-order correlations between 
dependent variabBs vere around .67, between the skill and the Duncan index 
variable. This is admittedly high, but the Duncan index for current or most 
recent job dnd the skill variable probably pick up a lot of the variation in 
wages that are not captured by education or job tenure. The introduction of 
variables for fatherfs education or Duncan index when the respondent was 15 
produced no significant result.s, not surprising for this age qroup at this 
time. Perhaps the most interesting result from this procedure is the 
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significdntly neqdt~ve coefficient on age. other studies have found this, 
but not usually until around age 60~ This result was robust under all 
specifica tions at tern p ted including the in troduct ion of an interaction term 
for age and tenure, AGE*TENURE. However, the interaction term estimation 
was uninformative Decause it was 99% collinear with the tenure variable. 
There is an interesting result that sheds a little light on the negative age 
cae ffic ie nt. Removal of the tenure variable, which was zero-order 
correlated w~tb age between .1-.2, resulted in the sign of tbe aqe 
coefficient remaining negative, out becoming insignificant. This indicates 
tbat whatever pos~t1ve effects age has on wages over this range is 1arg,11 
because of the correlation of age with job tenure. When tenure is 
introduced into tDe analysis, it takes on a significantly positive 
coefficiellt and dllows the effect of age to show shows its true colors 14 • 
To wrap up this d1Scussion zero-order correlations for the dependent 
variaLle wLtb al~ tue independent variables dre reported below: 
In!"laqe} HEALTH AGE EDUC SKIl,l RES RC.AN 
White • } 4 -.07 .43 .44 -.24 .51 
.36 .27 - . 52 .34 Black .05 -.1 1 
In (w aqe) TENUHE UNEM DADCAN (Duncan index fdther's 1ob) 
White .24 • 12 .25 
Black .26 .09 .08 
For the most part these results are consistant with the reqression resu1ts f 
particularly wLtn respect to Black/White differences. 
14This lase discussion applies only to the white results, the coefficient on 
age for DLacks remains negative and significant DO matter what is done. 
APPENDIX III: Technical Issues in Estimation 
a. Programming the Censored Regression Model 
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The censored regression model was estimated by an adaptation of the 
BMDP (1917) proprietary software subrogram PAB for derivative free 
non-linedr regression. Ordinarily the PAB program will estimdte a 
non-linear equation specified in a user written FORTRAN SUbroutine, tbe 
format of whica LS given in the BMDP manual. Users of IBM operating systems 
may specify the location of the subroutine in system job control language. 
For XEROX users ll.ke Oberlin College it is necessary to mod.ify the source 
code of the PAR program directly, inserting the user written subroutine as 
an internal SUbroutine to be compiled with the rest of the program. In 
addition, if it is necessary to introduce sampling weights into the 
likelihood function (as opposed to the data) because of biased sampling (in 
this case the unemployed were oversampled) an additional labelled COMMON 
block. should be created containing the weights. The main program may then 
pass this l.nformation to the subroutine without cumbersome, CPU time 
consuming read statements. PAR generates parameter estimates by least 
squares using d psuedo Gauss-Newton. algorithm. To adapt the program to do 
maximum likelinood estimation the least squares criteria for convergence may 
be turned off and replaced with a user supplied loss function in the FORTRAN 
su broutiDe. 'l'ne loss f uucti on, in this case - 2 times the log 1 ik. elihood , 
will be ID1D1mized at converqence~ (See pp. 4'99-513 in BMDP-77d There is 
an alternative method mentioned in the manual that is somewhat less 
t,ransparent. 
Users of smal~ and medium sized operating systems may expect to 
encounter several difficulties with the use of PARior maximum likelihood 
estimation witb cross-section data. The PAR program loads all the data into 
core memory and 1ts core requirements rise rapidly with the number of 
parameters to be estimated. For the CRM estimated bere there were twelve 
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parameters. It WaS found that the regular sized PAR program of 15,000 words 
could only est~mate that many parameters for about 200 cases. With the 
program workspace increased to 55,000 words and a number of program overlays 
the total core requ~red became 72,000 words, the maximum usable core on the 
Oberlin XEROX S~qma-9. At this size the program was capable of estimating 
twelve parameters for about 900 cases. The BHDP P3R program is also capable 
of maximum ~~kelibood estimation by the methods described above and in tbe 
BMDP-77 manual. It is more space efficient but requires that the user 
sUPFly partial derivatives for all parameters in the FORTRAN subroutine. 
The PAR program is slow, requiring about 60 minutes of CPU time for each 100 
iterations. 
The advantage of using the PAR program is that little complex 
programming is required of the user. An alternative, relatively labor 
intensive approach is a user written main program manipulating the 
Newton-Hapneson m1nimization and matrix inversion subroutines from the 
FOBTHAN scientific subroutine Package 15 • This approach is probably more 
efficient in terms of computer resource consumption as the programmer need 
not instruct his ma~n program to store the data in core during execution. 
Consumption of CPU time would probably qo up with this method because of 
additional input aud output tasks.. In addition, more pcoqramminq is 
reguiced for this approach than with the adaptation of relatively complete, 
user- friendly proprietary software. 
A number at parameters affecting ·the numerical alqorithm in PAR ma y be 
modified by the user. .For the CRM estima tes done here boundary constraints 
were imposed on all coefficients of (-10,+10) and constants of [-20,+20) and 
standard dev~ations, OJ and 0.. of (0,5). The only estimation to converge 
15The evaluation of the normal density and distribution in the FORTRAN 
likelihood fUDction subroutine was done using the FORTRAN Scienti£ic 
Subroutine Package subroutine NDTR in double precision arithmetic. 
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at a boun dar y point was the bliie k o;i term in the partici pa tion wage 
equation. Some possible reasons for this boundary convergence are qiven in 
the body of the paper. Another user controlled parameter is the number of 
inc~ement halvings aetween iterations in the search for a minimum of the 
loss function. The program defaults to a maximum of five. It was found 
that increas~ng the maximum number of increment halvings would sometimes 
reduce the number of iterations required for convergence. Var iat ions in 
increment nalvings and boundary consteaints did not have milch ,~fiect on 
coefficient estimaces tut did effect the standard errors of the estimates to 
some degree. For blacks the reported estimates were chosen on the basis of 
the lowest loss function for which the constant in the participation waqe 
equation did not converge to a boundary. ! The equation with a slightly 
lower loss function wberein the participation wage constant term did 
converge to boundary gave a constant of -201) For whites no parameter 
estimates converged at boundary points and different estimations qave very 
sirru.lar results. 
b. Init~ai VaLues Procedure 
Good LnLtLai values were very important. The procedure used here 
follows that suggested by Nelson (1974). The steps dre descrioed below: 
1. EstLUdc.e the expected wage equation for tlu2 employed by ordinary least 
sgual'€s. 
2. Reta~n the coefficients from step 1 and impute a fitted wage to all 
members of the sample, including the unemployed. 
3. Using toe f~tted wage as the observed wage = expected wage, 
analysis to estimate the probability that ie>Wp=B2X2+v. Gronau 
appl Y Pro hi t 
(1973, 
p. S 17 8) pro v ides a mo re deta iled ex plana tion 0 f tlw ap plica tion of Probi t to 
this ty pe of ti.rE:::SllOld F['ob lem and the in te eprata han of Prohi t 
coefficie nts. 
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Nelson {1974) points out tha t the Probit likelihood function is 
actually a spec1dl case of the CBM likelihood function when the COV(u#v) is 
zero and tile expected wage is observed for the entire sample. Then, 
Pr(W=O)=Pr(We(Wp)=Pr(v(B2X2-We) 




qi vinq sample lik.elihood ilaere Y (.L) loS €IlP..!.o1I11e1l t sta. tus i 
L(82,o-a...IY,We,X2)= 
UP ~2Xj.;W~ 7J H ~2Xj.;:lj") J 
-.51 '..S ~ 
which is the Probit .likelihood function. 
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